Threat-Based Risk Profiling Methodology

Developed by: GSA FedRAMP PMO

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Acknowledgements

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Organizational Affiliations

- General Services Administration (GSA)
  - FedRAMP PMO
  - 10x Program
  - Contractor Support - The Volpe Information Technology Group, Inc.

- Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
  - .gov Cybersecurity Architecture Review Program (.govCAR Program)
  - Contractor Support - Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL); MITRE Corporation

- Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council

- Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) Council
Scoring Teams

In addition to the above acknowledgments, a special note of thanks goes to the scoring team participants for their superb technical contributions. These scoring teams included the following individuals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Scoring Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
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● Edward Sweitzer (MITRE)  
● Kurt Beernink (MITRE) |
| Department of Interior (DOI) | ● Min Oh |
| General Services Administration (GSA) | ● Scott Boger (Noblis)  
● Scott Williams (Noblis)  
● Ashley Taylor (Noblis)  
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● Tom Volpe Jr. (VITG) |
Executive Summary

The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) promotes the adoption of secure cloud technology across the federal government by providing a standardized approach to security and risk assessment. FedRAMP aims to empower agencies to modernize operations using secure cloud solutions to improve agencies' information technology (IT) security. FedRAMP successfully made the authorization process more efficient by standardizing the security control requirements for cloud systems which enables security authorization package re-use.

In 2017, the Office of American Innovation (OAI) sponsored a feasibility study, coordinated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and managed by the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) Program Management Office (PMO). The objective of the study was to determine the feasibility of an agile approach to authorizations. It was determined that an agile approach to authorizations was feasible if a defensible methodology was established to prioritize controls.

FedRAMP, in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) .gov Cybersecurity Architecture Review (.govCAR) team, developed a methodology for scoring each NIST SP 800-53, rev. 4, security control against the National Security Agency’s (NSA)/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework v2 (NTCTF) to determine which security controls and capabilities are most effective to protect, detect, and respond to current prevalent threats. The goal of this initiative is to enable agencies, Cloud Service Providers (CSPs), and other industry partners to prioritize security controls that are relevant and effective against the current threat environment. This leads to informed, quantitative-based risk management decisions in authorizing information systems for government use.

This white paper outlines the methodology behind the threat-based scoring approach and informs stakeholders of potential applications.

Introduction

Cybersecurity is an essential part of the federal government’s IT infrastructure and operations. FedRAMP established uniform security baselines (High, Moderate, Low, and Tailored) and standardized a repeatable authorization process for government officials when authorizing cloud systems. Organizations have limited resources to combat a vast environment of dynamic threats and with limited resources there may be an inherent acceptance of more risk. There is opportunity to prioritize inherent risks based on efficacy against prevalent and real, current threats.
Organizations need to prioritize their cybersecurity investments to utilize resources effectively and reduce the greatest amount of risk. Standards such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and the Risk Management Framework (RMF) provide the foundation for achieving additional levels of security. When these frameworks are combined with real cybersecurity threat intelligence, a structured methodology for risk profiling and risk mitigation emerges.

The FedRAMP PMO, in partnership with the DHS CISA .govCAR Team, developed a threat-based framework and scoring methodology to prioritize NIST SP 800-53 security controls. The scoring methodology was adopted from the Department of Defense Cybersecurity Analysis and Review (DoDCAR) and .govCAR using the National Security Agency’s (NSA) threat framework (NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework, Version 2), which was originally developed for system architectures.

Each NIST SP 800-53 control within the FedRAMP moderate baseline was analyzed on its ability to protect, detect, and/or respond to each of the 218 threat actions outlined in the NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework. This enabled the prioritization of controls and controls items (i.e., specific countermeasures/protection capabilities) based on their efficacy to protect against real-world threats.

Through this innovative methodology, this approach can be utilized in several ways:

- Evaluation of security baselines with emphasis or focus on security controls that protect against observed real-world threats (versus hypothetical and theoretical threats)
- Prioritization of required controls that are re-evaluated on an annual basis
- The ability to provide Authorization Officials (AOs) with a risk profile that can further inform authorization decisions
- The potential ability to authorize systems in a phased approach by identifying when acceptable risk is achieved by the minimum prioritized control threshold
- Ability to more strategically deploy resources against security actions to reduce risk
- The ability to produce a comprehensive risk profile

.govCAR Scoring Methodology

The .govCAR scoring methodology provides an end-to-end holistic assessment of cybersecurity capabilities provided by DHS CISA and representative cybersecurity architectures of federal agencies. CISA adopted the .govCAR scoring methodology to allow for an end-to-end holistic assessment of cybersecurity capabilities provided by federal agencies. The results of the iterative assessment are being used to inform CISA’s approach to assisting agencies with insight and knowledge to make prioritized cybersecurity investment decisions across the .govCAR environment to enhance cybersecurity and reduce risk.

DoDCAR introduced the concept of a threat-based, end-to-end analysis of a typical cybersecurity architecture. It was used to provide direction and justification for cybersecurity investments during the Department of Defense (DoD) financial planning process. The .govCAR effort produces results in increments or “spins,” where each spin comprises a set of cybersecurity capabilities for security architecture assessment. The benefit of adapting this methodology and applying it to risk profiling include:

- The use of a proven, standardized, and repeatable process to score capabilities against threats
- The use of a well-defined set of definitions and a scoring rubric
Potential Outcomes of the Threat-Based Methodology

This threat-based risk methodology can be utilized to streamline the FedRAMP security authorization process. Potential benefits of this methodology include:

- Promotes efficient implementation of new technologies
- Focuses security on the greatest threats against federal information systems
- Allows faster authorizations which may decrease vendor time to market
- Increases the potential for reuse of security authorization packages across all agencies
- Enables the government and industry to invest cybersecurity budgets wisely
- Identifies significant gaps and duplications in security
- Standardizes security control parameters to increase the potential for reuse of security authorization packages

Threat-Based Risk Profiling Methodology

We developed a comprehensive methodology to attain an effective threat-based approach to risk profiling. This methodology consists of three phases:

Phase 1: Threat-Based Analysis (i.e., Security Controls Scoring)

A subset of the NIST security controls\(^1\) contain embedded parameters (i.e., assignment and selection statements) that require agencies or organizations to define their own parameters. This approach can result in differing security implementations that need to be reviewed individually by each agency to determine acceptability. Normalizing these parameters creates the ability to avoid potential roadblocks in achieving maximum cloud adoption among the federal agencies as it may increase the reuse of security authorization packages from agency to agency and/or decrease the level of effort for each authorization.

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\(^1\) NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Rev. 4 - Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations
After an extensive analysis of data provided by the Chief Information Security Officer’s (CISO’s) Council, a set of common values for these parameters was identified. These common values were compared against the FedRAMP defined parameters in the FedRAMP baselines and an overall recommended normalized value for each of the defined security control parameters was determined. These normalized parameters were further evaluated during control scoring sessions by representatives from the DHS CISA .govCAR program, the FedRAMP PMO, and the DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. The parameters were adjusted during these sessions to establish the most reasonable level of security and to protect against the most prevalent threat actions.

The NIST SP 800-53 security controls were scored using DHS CISA .govCAR methodology and rated for their ability to Protect, Detect, and Respond (P/D/R) against a series of threat actions enumerated using a cyber threat framework. Each security control was assigned a value of Limited, Moderate, Significant, or Not Applicable for the functions of Protect, Detect, and Respond for each threat action.

The scoring was performed by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from several agencies and organizations. The scoring process utilized a form of the Delphi method to seek input from multiple experts who exchanged scoring opinions with supporting arguments. A scoring rubric helped normalize the scores based on the characteristics of the capability. The outcome was a collective group consensus for each capability scored with supporting rationale. The results of the control scoring were used to calculate an overall protection value for each control. The higher the value, the greater the level of protection provided by the control (i.e., more threat actions mitigated). Appendix A: Security Controls Scoring, provides detailed, step-by-step descriptions of the control scoring process.

These protection values were then combined with the results from automated and manual security control assessments (see Phase 2) to produce a risk profile based upon the maturity of security capabilities (see Phase 3).

Phase 2: Security Controls Assessment

To enable automation and integration in the risk scoring process, the NIST SP 800-53 security controls are deconstructed into control items. Control items are the more granular parts of a security control that are assessed by determination statements defined within NIST SP 800-53A, rev4. Deconstruction of security controls into control items allows them to be grouped into security capabilities with defined, testable defect checks. This approach allows for data from automated and manual assessments to be integrated into the overall risk profiling process. An assessment of the system implementation of a control item results in a status of “Satisfied” or “Other than satisfied.” The assigned value for each control item was then used as an input for risk profiling.

Appendix B: Security Controls Assessment provides example details and a step-by-step approach for utilizing the threat-based control scores from the security assessment.

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Phase 3: Risk Profiling

The NIST SP 800-53, rev 4, security controls were mapped to the sixteen (16) NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 8011 capabilities. The purpose of the NISTIR 8011 is to provide an approach for automating assessments of security controls in systems. This can be utilized for initial assessments, continuous monitoring, and ongoing security authorizations.

To derive a risk profile, the protection values that were assigned to each security control during the threat analysis/scoring phase and the assessment results (i.e., satisfied/other than satisfied) for each control item were leveraged to compute an overall risk maturity level for each security capability, as shown in Figure 1.

Appendix C: Risk Profiling provides details and a step-by-step approach for determining the risk maturity profile of a system.

### Applications of Threat-Based Risk Profiling

The threat-based approach to risk profiling enables a wide range of opportunities for the government and industry to utilize the resulting data to make informed risk-based decisions. Additional opportunities for application of this approach are under exploration. Table 1, Potential Additional Opportunities for Application of this Approach, details a high-level set of initial opportunities, along with the potential impact of applying the threat-based model.

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3 NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 8011 Automation Support for Security Control Assessments. Volume 1 June 2017
Table 1. Potential Additional Opportunities for Application of this Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incorporate into Annual Assessments and Continuous Monitoring</td>
<td>Enables annual assessments and continuous monitoring activities to focus on prioritized risks that address prevalent threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce Risk Profiles using the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL) (e.g., SAR, POA&amp;M, CDM sensors)</td>
<td>Enables adoption of automated, near real-time and current updates of the threat environment to generate a true risk profile for an information system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist Authorization decision-making</td>
<td>Provides threat-based data that better informs risk management decisions and authorizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritize Remediation Efforts</td>
<td>Enables information resource spending and allocation by allowing the government and industry to address the most significant problems first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify Desired Future State</td>
<td>Enables strategic planning to assist with roadmapping and cost benefit analyses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

FedRAMP is committed to evaluating ways to continuously drive efficiency and cost-savings by adapting and improving its processes to better service federal cloud cybersecurity needs. Today’s authorization approach identifies residual risk based on high, moderate, and low security impact. The FedRAMP PMO anticipates that with the right tools and processes, vendors could enter the federal marketplace faster, using fewer of their own and federal resources, and with more secure systems that protect against the most current threat landscape.

With a threat-based risk profile, agencies, CSPs, and other industry partners can strategically manage and develop the protection of their systems. This threat-based methodology provides an innovative approach to inform risk management decisions across the government. Additionally, this approach provides an opportunity to expedite the authorization process by prioritizing controls that mitigate threats and vulnerabilities posing the most risk to our federal systems and data.

Industry and federal government entities are encouraged to review this approach, methodology, and intended impact and provide feedback to the FedRAMP PMO. All questions and comments regarding the details outlined in this paper should be directed to the FedRAMP PMO via info@fedramp.gov, including the subject line “Feedback: FedRAMP PMO Threat-Based Risk Profiling Approach.”
Appendix A: Security Controls Scoring

Step 1. Control Item Scoring

To support scoring each NIST SP 800-53, rev4, control was deconstructed into its associated control items. Threat scoring was performed at the control item level so that each control item could be classified as Defined, Document, or Implement. See Figure 2: Control Item Classification below for more.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defined</th>
<th>Control item defines the implementation standards for the control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>Control item requires the documentation of related security relevant information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement</td>
<td>Control item implements a Protect (P), Detect (D), or Respond (R) capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control items classified as “implemented” can take on one of the following values:

- Significant (S)
- Moderate (M)
- Limited (L)
- Applicable (A)
- Not Applicable (NA)
- None (N)

Control items classified as “Defined” or “Document” can take on one of the following values:

- Applicable (A)
- Not Applicable (NA)

Each control item was scored for its ability to P/D/R to each threat action. To calculate the overall protection value for each control item P/D/R functions were weighted as follows:

- P = .4
- D = .3
- R = .3

The weighting was applied for each control item that received a P/D/R score and the sum of the weighted P/D/R scores was multiplied by the threat action heatmap value to produce a protection value for each control. This process was repeated for every threat action that received a score for the associated control.

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4 Representative examples of adversarial threat events expressed as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
item and the summation of those individual protection values produced an overall Protection Value (PV) for the control. The formula below depicts the computation of the control PV:

**Protection Value (PV) Formula:**

\[
PV = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P \cdot A_{\text{security control}} = \left\{ 4 \cdot \left( \frac{P_{\text{Implement}}}{2} + \frac{P_{\text{Define}}}{2} + \frac{P_{\text{Implement}}}{2} + \frac{P_{\text{Describe}}}{2} \right) + 3 \cdot \left( \frac{P_{\text{No Implement}}}{2} + \frac{P_{\text{No Define}}}{2} + \frac{P_{\text{No Implement}}}{2} + \frac{P_{\text{No Describe}}}{2} \right) \right\}
\]

**Notes:** PS (0,1) takes the value 0 if there was no Significant Protect score and the value of 1 if the Protect score is Significant. Similarly, RL (0,1) takes the value 0 if there was no Limited Respond score and the value of 1 if the Respond score is Limited. Threat Action Heat Map Values were provided by DHS CISA .govCAR.

### Step 2. Security Control Prioritization

To prioritize the security controls, the security control items were regrouped back into their associated security controls. As the control items were grouped for scoring by those items that were classified as “implement,” or “define/document,” it was possible to get two different protection values for each control. The overall protection value for each security control was calculated by summing the distinct protection values for all of the control items associated with that control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AC-2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(a)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(b)</td>
<td>20.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(c)</td>
<td>20.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(d)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(e)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(f)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-2(g)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(i)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(j)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(k)</td>
<td>20.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4: Security Controls Protection Value**

With the overall protection values for each security control now defined, it is possible to rank the security controls in priority order.

### Appendix B: Security Controls Assessment

Ranking of security controls by their protection values enables the organization to establish an assessment threshold shifting the focus of the security controls assessment to evaluating only those security controls
which fall above the established threshold. This prioritization has the potential to provide the foundation for streamlining the security authorization process.

The results of the security controls assessment for each control (satisfied, or other than satisfied) and the protection value of the control can be leveraged to produce an implementation value for each control which is weighted based upon the protection values of the related control items. The formula below represents the calculation for control implementation value:

\[
\text{Control Implementation Value} = \left( \sum PV_{\text{Control Items}} \times \% \text{control items implemented} \right) / PV
\]

For example, Figure 5 demonstrates the Security Control Implementation Value (AC-2 Example) illustrating how to utilize the assessment results to compute an overall implementation value for a security control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account Management (AC-2)</th>
<th>PV</th>
<th>Imp. Status</th>
<th>CI Score</th>
<th>Sub-totals</th>
<th>Imp. Value</th>
<th>%Imp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(a)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>47.44</td>
<td>61.19</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(b)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(c)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(d)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(e)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(f)</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(g)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<td>AC-2(h)</td>
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<td>63.25</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>63.25</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-2(j)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td>20.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-2(k)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Security Control Implementation Value (AC-2 Example)

Appendix C: Risk Profiling (i.e., Capability Maturity Levels)

To create an overall system threat-based risk profile (capability maturity scores), each of the NIST 800-53, rev 4, security controls was mapped to the security capabilities listed in NISTIR 8011. It is important to note that a single control can support multiple capabilities. The implementation values for each of the security controls were then used to calculate an overall maturity level for each capability (see Table 2, Capability Maturity Levels.) Figure 6 below provides an example of this process for the security capability Manage Trust for Persons Granted Access (TRUST).
Once each of the sixteen security capabilities has been assigned a maturity level it now becomes possible to produce an overall Prioritized Risk Profile (maturity level) for the information system.

### Table 2: Capability Maturity Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control No.</th>
<th>Control Name</th>
<th>% Implemented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC-2</td>
<td>Account Management</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-5</td>
<td>Separation of Duties</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-6</td>
<td>Least Privilege</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Capability Maturity Level:** 84%

**Figure 6: Capability Maturity Level (TRUST)**

Appendix D: Maintenance

DHS CISA .govCAR continues to evaluate the threat landscape and updates the threat framework and heat map accordingly. In addition, as the NIST SP 800-53 security controls catalog is updated, additional scoring initiatives will be required. These changes will be evaluated, and additional scoring sessions will be conducted.

To streamline this process the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL) will be implemented to programatically compare versions of NIST SP 800-53 and to automatically identify changes/gaps. As new scoring data becomes available, the control risk P/D/R scores will be updated.